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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
In 1991, Chedell Williams was shot and killed in 
Philadelphia. James Dennis was convicted of her murder and 
was sentenced to death. In a series of decisions over thirteen 
years, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Dennis’s 
conviction and sentence and denied his application for post-
conviction relief. Dennis filed an application under 28 U.S.C. 
 4 
§ 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania in which he claimed that a variety of 
federal constitutional violations justified a writ of habeas 
corpus. The District Court held that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court unreasonably applied Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny in rejecting Dennis’s claims 
that the prosecution had withheld three pieces of exculpatory 
and material information. Concluding that the prosecution 
had in fact breached its obligations under Brady, the District 
Court granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus and 
directed the Commonwealth to retry Dennis or release him. 
For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order and remand the case for consideration of 
Dennis’s remaining claims. 
I. 
A. 
On October 22, 1991, at around 1:50 p.m., Chedell 
Williams and her friend, Zahra Howard, began to climb the 
stairs to the Fern Rock SEPTA Station in Philadelphia. Two 
men approached them and demanded their earrings. Both girls 
fled, but one of the men caught Williams. He pulled her 
earrings off and shot her in the neck with a silver handgun. 
The shooter then ran by a construction worker, Thomas 
Bertha, who stepped towards the shooter. When the shooter 
raised his gun in Bertha’s direction, Bertha briefly stopped 
but followed the shooter after he ran past Bertha. Bertha was 
three or four feet from the shooter when the shooter passed 
him. The two assailants entered a waiting car and drove off. 
Williams died of her injuries. 
Howard and other bystanders described the shooter as 
an African-American male; between 5’7” and 5’10”; between 
130 and 160 pounds; between 15 and 20 years old; and 
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wearing a red sweat suit, a black jacket, a baseball cap, and 
white sneakers. After the police heard rumors that James 
Dennis had committed the murder, officers showed Howard 
and other bystanders a photo line-up including Dennis’s 
picture. Howard identified Dennis, saying, “This one looks 
like the guy, but I can’t be sure.” (J.A. 1509.) A SEPTA 
employee, James Cameron, also identified Dennis and said 
that he looked similar to the shooter, especially from the side, 
but that he could not be sure. Two construction workers, 
Bertha and Anthony Overstreet, also agreed that Dennis 
looked like the shooter. But four witnesses did not identify 
Dennis from the array. Dennis was 21 years old, African-
American, 5’5”, and between 125 and 132 pounds. 
In early November 1991, the police interviewed a 
member of Dennis’s singing group, Charles Thompson, who 
said that he saw Dennis with a silver handgun at their practice 
the night of Williams’s murder. 
On November 22, 1991, the police arrested Dennis. He 
signed a statement in which he said that on the day of the 
murder, he had stayed at his father’s house until about 1:30 
p.m., when his father drove him to the bus stop. He said that 
he then rode the bus for 30 minutes to the intersection of 
Henry and Midvale Avenues, that he saw a woman he knew 
named Latanya Cason, and that “[w]hen we got off the bus I 
waved to her.” (J.A. 1676.) He said he then walked about a 
half of a mile to Abbottsford Homes, a public housing 
complex, and spent the rest of the day with his friends there. 
Dennis’s father also said that Dennis had spent the morning at 
his father’s house and that his father had driven Dennis to the 
bus stop at 1:53 p.m. The police searched Dennis’s father’s 
house; the lead detective signed a report stating that officers 
discovered two black jackets, a pair of red pants, and a pair of 
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white sneakers. However, the police lost these items before 
trial. 
On December 19, 1991, the police conducted an in-
person line-up involving Dennis and five other individuals 
Dennis selected. Howard, Cameron, Bertha, and Overstreet 
participated. Howard identified Dennis, saying, “I think it was 
[him].” (J.A. 229.) Cameron and Bertha identified Dennis 
without reservation. But Overstreet identified a different 
member of the line-up.  
In January 1992, officers interviewed Latanya Cason, 
the woman Dennis said he saw the day of the murder when 
getting off the bus between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m. Cason said 
that she had seen Dennis that day, but at a different time. She 
said that she got off work at 2:00 p.m., collected her public-
assistance funds, and ran a few errands before taking the bus 
to the Henry and Midvale Avenues intersection. Therefore, 
she estimated that she saw Dennis that day between 4:00 and 
4:30 p.m. 
Not all of the information the police received indicated 
that Dennis was the perpetrator. On October 24, 2011, 
officers interviewed Chedell Williams’s aunt, Diane Pugh. 
The officers’ report states that Pugh told them that Zahra 
Howard—Williams’s friend and an eyewitness—recognized 
the suspects from the high school she and Williams attended. 
Dennis did not attend the same school as Howard and 
Williams. The report indicates that the officers intended to 
follow up with Howard about this comment, but they never 
did. 
Additionally, on October 31, 1991, an inmate at the 
Montgomery County Correctional Facility, William Frazier, 
called the Montgomery County Detective Bureau and told 
them he had information about Williams’s murder. The 
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Montgomery County Detective Bureau passed the tip on to 
the Philadelphia police, who then interviewed Frazier. Frazier 
told them that his aunt had initiated a three-way call with his 
friend, Tony Brown. Frazier said that Brown admitted to 
killing Williams and that the gun went off accidentally. 
Frazier also said that Brown implicated two men—Ricky 
Walker, Frazier’s cousin, and Skeet—and that they were 
hiding out in Frazier’s previous apartment. Frazier told the 
officers that Brown had a history of committing armed 
robberies. Frazier then went on a ride-along with the officers 
and identified a pawn shop where he believed Brown, 
Walker, and Skeet would have sold the earrings; Brown’s 
home; Brown’s girlfriend’s home; Walker’s home; and 
Skeet’s home. 
The police then interviewed Walker. Walker said he 
knew Williams from high school, but he denied having 
anything to do with Williams’s murder and denied knowing 
Brown or Skeet. He said that his mother could verify that he 
was sleeping when Williams was murdered and that Frazier 
had previously burglarized Walker’s home and charged 
$1,000 in calls to Walker’s family. The officers also 
interviewed the owner of Frazier’s previous apartment, who 
said that no one had entered the apartment to his knowledge. 
Finally, the police went to an address they thought was the 
address Frazier gave them for Skeet and found no one who 
knew of him; however, they went to the wrong address. They 
did not confirm Walker’s alibi, investigate the pawn shop 
Frazier identified, locate Tony Brown, or contact Frazier’s 
aunt. 
The prosecution did not give Dennis the police report 
of Diane Pugh’s interview or any of the reports and other 
documents relating to Frazier’s tip. 
 8 
Dennis’s trial began on October 2, 1992. The 
prosecution called three eyewitnesses who identified Dennis 
as the shooter: Howard, Cameron, and Bertha. The 
prosecution also called Charles Thompson, from Dennis’s 
singing group, who testified that he saw Dennis with a gun 
the night of the murder. A police detective testified that 
officers recovered clothing from Dennis’s father’s house that 
was similar to what eyewitnesses described the shooter wore. 
And the prosecution called Latanya Cason, who testified that 
she saw Dennis at the Henry and Midvale Avenues 
intersection between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. on the day of the 
shooting. The gun and Williams’s earrings were never found 
and so were not presented at trial. 
Dennis presented witnesses who corroborated his alibi 
that he had been with his father before the shooting and took 
the bus to Abbottsford in the afternoon. Three members of his 
singing group testified that Charles Thompson was jealous of 
Dennis. Other witnesses testified to Dennis’s good character. 
Dennis also testified. 
A jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, 
robbery, conspiracy, carrying a weapon without a license, and 
possessing the instruments of a crime. During the penalty 
phase, the jury found one aggravating circumstance, that the 
killing was committed in the course of a felony, and one 
mitigating circumstance, that Dennis had no significant 
criminal history. The jury sentenced Dennis to death. 
Dennis appealed. During his appeal, in 1997, his new 
appellate counsel went to the regional Department of Public 
Welfare (“DPW”) office and found Cason’s receipt from 
when she picked up her public-assistance funds on the day of 
the murder. The receipt indicated that Cason had picked up 
the funds at 13:03, or 1:03 p.m., earlier than she had testified 
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at Dennis’s trial. Counsel interviewed Cason, and she stated 
that when the police interviewed her for the first time before 
trial, the officers already had a copy of the receipt. She stated 
that she then found her copy of the receipt and that the 
officers took her copy as well. She also stated that she 
reviewed the receipt during the interview and likely had been 
confused by the receipt’s use of military time. She thought 
that because of that confusion, she told the officers the wrong 
time she saw Dennis on the day of the murder. But based on 
the correct time from the receipt, she now believed she likely 
had seen Dennis between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m., as Dennis had 
told the police during the investigation and testified at trial. 
B. 
In his direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, Dennis argued, among other things, that he had 
received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial 
counsel’s failure to investigate Cason and that the prosecution 
violated his due process rights when it did not produce the 
public-assistance receipt before the trial. See Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court unanimously 
rejected both claims.1 Commonwealth v. Dennis (Dennis I), 
715 A.2d 404, 408 (Pa. 1998). The court concluded that 
Dennis could not succeed on his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim because “[Cason’s] testimony would not 
support [Dennis’s] alibi, because the murder occurred . . . 
forty minutes earlier than Cason’s earliest estimate” and 
because her testimony “would have been cumulative” of other 
                                              
1 Three justices dissented on a different issue, 
prosecutorial misconduct. Dennis I, 715 A.2d at 416 
(Zappala, J., dissenting). 
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testimony that Dennis arrived at Abbottsford Homes between 
2:15 and 2:30 p.m. Id. With respect to Dennis’s Brady claim, 
the court stated, “Finally, it is clear that there clearly was no 
Brady violation. The [public-assistance] receipt was not 
exculpatory, because it had no bearing on Appellant’s alibi, 
and there is no evidence that the Commonwealth withheld the 
receipt from the defense.” Id. The court rejected Dennis’s 
other claims and affirmed his conviction and death sentence. 
Id. at 416. 
Dennis filed a timely petition pursuant to 
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 
received new counsel, and also received discovery. In 
discovery, Dennis received the police report of Diane Pugh’s 
interview, which indicated that Zahra Howard told Pugh that 
Howard recognized the shooter from her high school. He also 
received William Frazier’s initial statement to the 
Montgomery County Detective Bureau, his statement to the 
Philadelphia police, a search consent form Frazier signed, a 
police report of officers’ interview with Ricky Walker, Ricky 
Walker’s statement, and a police report of officers’ interview 
with Frazier’s previous landlord (collectively the “Frazier 
lead documents”). Dennis then amended his petition to 
include claims that the prosecution violated Brady by not 
disclosing the report of Pugh’s interview and the Frazier lead 
documents. After evidentiary hearings, the PCRA court 
denied the petition. 
Dennis appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
again. The court affirmed the judgment in part, vacated the 
judgment in part, and remanded for further proceedings. 
Commonwealth v. Dennis (Dennis III), 950 A.2d 945, 979 
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(Pa. 2008).2 With respect to the Frazier lead documents, the 
court restated its recent precedent interpreting Brady, which 
held that the prosecution did not have to disclose “‘every 
fruitless lead’” and that “‘inadmissible evidence cannot be the 
basis for a Brady violation.’” Id. at 968 (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 857 (Pa. 2005)). 
Before Lambert, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had held 
that Brady applied to withheld information that “might have 
had” an effect on “the preparation of the defense” as well as 
“the presentation of the defense at trial.” Commonwealth v. 
Green, 640 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. 1994). Noting this 
disagreement in Dennis III, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
stated, “Lambert indicates that evidence sought under Brady 
must be material and admissible. In the absence of any 
argument regarding the gravamen of Lambert and its effect on 
the continuing precedential value of Green, [Dennis] has 
failed to establish a basis for relief with regard to this 
evidence.” 950 A.2d at 968. 
However, with respect to the police report of Pugh’s 
interview, the court found that there was insufficient evidence 
in the record and insufficient explanation for the court to 
affirm the denial of Dennis’s Brady claim. Id. at 969. 
Accordingly, the court vacated that portion of the PCRA 
court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. Id. After 
                                              
2 The prosecution had filed an interlocutory appeal 
challenging the PCRA court’s grant of discovery on the 
prosecution’s voir dire notes, and the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court reversed. Commonwealth v. Dennis (Dennis II), 859 
A.2d 1270, 1280 (Pa. 2004). Although the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s 2004 decision is not relevant to this appeal, 
we refer the court’s 2008 decision as Dennis III for the sake 
of completeness. 
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hearing testimony from Pugh and Howard, the PCRA court 
again denied Dennis’s PCRA petition. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. 
Commonwealth v. Dennis (Dennis IV), 17 A.3d 297, 309-10 
(Pa. 2011). The court concluded that the police report was not 
material because “Howard was extensively cross-examined . . 
. includ[ing] Howard’s identification of the shooter” and 
because “there were two eyewitnesses other than Howard 
who observed the shooting at close range . . . [and who] 
positively identified [Dennis] as the shooter in a photo array, 
in a line up, and at trial.” Id. at 309. Therefore, the court 
found that a different result was not reasonably probable. Id. 
Dennis then filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania that raised approximately twenty 
claims. After full briefing, the District Court granted Dennis a 
conditional writ of habeas corpus. Dennis v. Wetzel (Dennis 
V), 966 F. Supp. 2d 489, 518 (E.D. Pa. 2013). The District 
Court concluded that Dennis was entitled to relief on his 
Brady claims with respect to the Frazier lead documents, 
Cason’s public-assistance receipt, and the police report of 
Pugh’s interview. Id. With respect to the Frazier lead 
documents, the District Court concluded that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s requirement that evidence be 
admissible to trigger Brady and its determination that the 
Frazier lead was “fruitless” were unreasonable applications of 
clearly-established federal law. Id. at 503-06. With respect to 
Cason’s public-assistance receipt, the District Court 
concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s statement 
that the receipt was not withheld was an unreasonable 
determination of the facts and its conclusion that the receipt 
was not material was an unreasonable application of clearly-
established federal law. Id. at 508-12. Finally, with respect to 
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the police report of Pugh’s interview, the District Court 
concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
determination that Howard’s cross-examination rendered the 
report immaterial and its determination that the report would 
not have affected the other eyewitnesses’ testimony were 
unreasonable applications of clearly-established federal law. 
Id. at 514-17. The District Court also concluded that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to undertake a cumulative 
materiality analysis as required by United States Supreme 
Court precedent. Id. at 517-18. The District Court withheld 
ruling on many of Dennis’s remaining claims. Id. at 491, 501 
n.19, & 510 n.27. The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over Dennis’s 
habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
Because the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing 
and relied on the state court record, we exercise plenary 
review and apply the same standard the District Court 
applied. Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 845 (3d Cir. 2013). 
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (“AEDPA”), federal courts reviewing a state prisoner’s 
application for a writ of habeas corpus may not grant relief 
“with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 
in State court proceedings” unless the claim (1) “resulted in a 
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “resulted in 
a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “This is a difficult to 
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meet and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court 
rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the 
benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ____, 
____, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). Dennis carries the burden of proving 
his entitlement to the writ. Id. 
A decision is “contrary to” federal law if “the state 
court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set 
forth in [Supreme Court] cases” or “if the state court 
confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable 
from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless 
arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.” 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A decision 
is an “unreasonable application” of federal law if the state 
court identified the correct governing legal rule but applied 
the rule to the facts of the case in an objectively unreasonable 
manner. Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010). A decision 
is based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” if the 
state court’s factual findings are objectively unreasonable in 
light of the evidence presented to the state court. Miller-El v. 
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 
Our review of a state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition 
follows a “prescribed path”: first, we determine what 
arguments or theories supported or could have supported the 
state court’s decision; second, we ask “‘whether it is possible 
fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or 
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision 
of the Supreme Court’”; and finally, we ask whether the state 
court’s decision “‘was so lacking in justification that there 
was an error well understood and comprehended in existing 
law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” 
Eley, 712 F.3d at 846-47 (alterations omitted) (quoting 
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Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-
87 (2011)). 
Each of the claims at issue in this appeal involves 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 83. Brady held that the suppression of 
material evidence favorable to the defense violates due 
process. Id. at 87. To prove a Brady violation, a defendant 
must show (1) the evidence was favorable to him; (2) the 
evidence was “suppressed” by the state; and (3) the evidence 
was material such that the defendant was prejudiced by the 
failure to disclose it. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-
82 (1999). Evidence is material if “there is a reasonable 
probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced 
a different verdict.” Id. at 281. 
III. 
The District Court held that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court unreasonably applied Brady in rejecting Dennis’s 
claims that the prosecution withheld the Frazier lead 
documents, Cason’s public-assistance receipt, and the police 
report of Pugh’s interview. We address whether Dennis is 
entitled to relief based on each of the three items and 
conclude that he is not. The Commonwealth has also asked us 
to remand this case to a different judge. We will not. 
A. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the 
prosecution did not violate its disclosure obligations under 
Brady with respect to the Frazier lead documents because 
Dennis did not show that the documents were admissible and 
material. Dennis III, 950 A.2d at 968. That the documents 
were inadmissible and immaterial were independent and 
alternate grounds to reject this claim. Therefore, either ground 
is capable of defeating Dennis’s claim. We find that the 
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admissibility issue disposes of this claim and only address 
that issue. 
To prevail, Dennis must show that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s requirement that evidence be admissible to 
trigger Brady is contrary to or an unreasonable application of 
United States Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1). Dennis has not identified any holding of the 
Supreme Court that specifically states that evidence does not 
need to be admissible in order to trigger Brady or any 
Supreme Court case with materially indistinguishable facts. 
Accordingly, the admissibility requirement is not contrary to 
Supreme Court precedent. 
We also conclude that the admissibility requirement is 
not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court based its admissibility 
requirement on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1 (1995) (per curiam). In 
Wood, state prosecutors had not disclosed the results of a 
polygraph test that the polygraph examiner opined may have 
indicated a key witness was not telling the truth. Id. at 4. The 
state courts rejected the defendant’s Brady claim, and the 
Supreme Court held that the state courts did not unreasonably 
apply clearly-established federal law. Id. at 4, 9. Specifically, 
the Court held that Brady governs the disclosure of 
“evidence,” “the polygraph results were inadmissible under 
state law,” and therefore the polygraph results were “not 
‘evidence’ at all.” Id. at 5-6. “Disclosure of the polygraph 
results, then, could have had no direct effect on the outcome 
of trial, because [the defendant] could have made no mention 
of them either during argument or while questioning 
witnesses.” Id. at 6. 
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The Ninth Circuit had held that the polygraph results 
would have given defense counsel “a stronger reason to 
pursue an investigation” of the defendant’s theory and may 
have uncovered evidence that could have been used at trial. 
Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme 
Court found that this “speculation” was improper because the 
defendant’s trial counsel indicated that the polygraph results 
would not have changed his trial preparation. Id. at 6-8. The 
Court concluded,  
In short, it is not “reasonably likely” that 
disclosure of the polygraph results—
inadmissible under state law—would 
have resulted in a different outcome at 
trial. Even without [the witness’s] 
testimony, the case against [the 
defendant] was overwhelming. . . . [In 
light of the evidence against the 
defendant], it should take more than 
supposition on the weak premises 
offered by [the defendant] to undermine 
a court’s confidence in the outcome. 
 
Id. at 8. 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could reasonably 
read the Wood decision as holding that because the withheld 
document was not admissible under state law, it was not 
“evidence” that triggered Brady. The remainder of the 
opinion discussing the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning can 
reasonably be read as dicta, correcting an improperly loose 
standard in § 2254 cases for when a reasonable probability of 
a different result exists. 
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Two of our sister courts of appeals have also held that 
information must be admissible to trigger Brady, a fact that 
confirms our conclusion that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of Wood is reasonable. The Seventh 
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit both agree that Brady only 
applies to information that will be admissible. See United 
States v. Morales, 746 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 2014) 
(collecting cases); Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1356 
n.3 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Wood) (“[T]hese statements may 
well have been inadmissible at trial . . .  and therefore, as a 
matter of law, ‘immaterial’ for Brady purposes.”). 
It is irrelevant that the Supreme Court has never 
expressly limited Brady to admissible evidence. And it is 
irrelevant that we and other courts have held that Brady 
applies to inadmissible information if it is otherwise material. 
See Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 129-30 (3d Cir. 2013). 
These are not the tests; the test is whether the state court’s 
decision is an unreasonable application of clearly-established 
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federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).3 
Our decisions in Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308 
(3d Cir. 2012), and in Johnson are not to the contrary. In 
Munchinski, the Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the 
defendant’s claims under a heightened materiality standard—
that the evidence would change the outcome—and the fact 
that the withheld information was not admissible was only 
one factor in that approach. Munchinski v. Wilson, 807 F. 
Supp. 2d 242, 279 (W.D. Pa. 2011). Although we affirmed 
the district court’s grant of habeas corpus relief because the 
state courts unreasonably applied Brady, the final state post-
conviction decision did not reject the defendant’s Brady claim 
only because the information was inadmissible. Moreover, we 
did not address whether a state court’s requirement that 
information be admissible under Brady would be a reasonable 
                                              
3 The District Court’s analysis of this claim 
specifically noted that “most circuit courts,” including this 
Court, have rejected the premise that inadmissible evidence 
cannot be a basis for a Brady claim. Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 
2d at 503 (emphasis added). This circuit majority is irrelevant 
in a habeas corpus action because the Supreme Court has 
instructed that “circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court.’” Parker v. Matthews, ___ U.S. ____, ____, 132 S. Ct. 
2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1)). Furthermore, the “diverging approaches [of the 
courts of appeals] illustrate the possibility of fairminded 
disagreement,” demonstrating that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s reliance on the inadmissibility of the evidence was 
not unreasonable. White v. Woodall, ___ U.S. ____, ____, 
134 S. Ct. 1697, 1703 n.3 (2014). 
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application of federal law. And in Johnson, the state courts 
had not addressed the defendant’s Brady claim on the merits, 
so we reviewed it in the first instance to determine whether to 
excuse his default. 705 F.3d at 127-30. Accordingly, we did 
not hold that an admissibility requirement is an unreasonable 
application of clearly-established federal law.4 
We have concluded that the state courts could 
reasonably require Dennis to show that the Frazier lead 
documents would be admissible in order to trigger Brady’s 
                                              
4 Dennis has also drawn our attention to Gumm v. 
Mitchell, ___ F.3d ____, 2014 WL 7247393 (6th Cir. Dec. 
22, 2014). We find this case to be inapplicable for similar 
reasons. First, the State did not attempt to justify denying the 
defendant’s Brady claim on the basis that the withheld 
evidence was inadmissible; the State argued that the evidence 
was inadmissible and was unlikely to lead to admissible 
evidence. Id. at *17 (“The state’s primary argument against 
the materiality of the undisclosed evidence in this case is that 
much of it is inadmissible hearsay and could not have led to 
the discovery of admissible evidence.” (emphasis added)). 
Accordingly, this case does not address the question of 
whether an admissibility requirement is a reasonable 
application of Supreme Court precedent. And second, the 
court adjudicated the Brady claim in the first instance because 
the state courts had found they lacked jurisdiction over the 
claim. Id. at *11. Therefore, the court was not even reviewing 
a state-court decision. Although the court addressed the claim 
as though § 2254(d) deference applied, it did so only in dicta. 
Id. at *23-24. Because the court was not reviewing a state-
court decision and was not considering the same question 
presented to this Court, Gumm does not alter or impact our 
analysis.  
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disclosure requirement. So if the court concluded that the 
Frazier lead documents were inadmissible as a matter of state 
law, then the court could reasonably reject this claim, and we 
would be unable to grant Dennis relief. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Dennis 
did not show that the Frazier lead documents would be 
admissible. Dennis provides many reasons why the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision on admissibility is 
wrong. However, “a state court’s interpretation of state law . . 
. binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.” Bradshaw v. 
Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam). We cannot 
reverse the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision on a 
state-law matter. Dennis suggests that this evidence would 
have been admissible under Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 
441-54 (1995). However, in Kyles, the Court was predicting 
how the state courts would rule on the admissibility of prior 
statements by eyewitnesses. It did not overrule a state court’s 
evidentiary ruling. Dennis also argues that the documents are 
admissible under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 
(1973). Dennis raises this argument for the first time on 
appeal, and so he has waived it. See Del. Nation v. 
Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding such 
arguments waived). Even considering this argument on the 
merits, it fails. Chambers was a “highly case-specific error 
correction,” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 52 (1996) 
(plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.), when “mechanistic[ ]” 
application of hearsay rules that did not include a statement 
against penal interest exception resulted in the exclusion of 
exculpatory evidence, Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. Dennis 
does not challenge the substance of the Pennsylvania hearsay 
rules or argue that they were applied mechanistically to defeat 
the ends of justice. Instead, he argues that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court applied the Commonwealth’s evidentiary 
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rules incorrectly. That application is a state-court 
determination of state law by which we are bound. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasonably applied 
federal law to hold that Brady’s disclosure requirement does 
not apply to inadmissible evidence. And the court found as a 
matter of state law that the Frazier lead documents were 
inadmissible. Therefore, Dennis is not entitled to relief on this 
claim.5 
B. 
We next turn to Latanya Cason’s public-assistance 
receipt. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the 
prosecution did not breach its obligations under Brady 
because the receipt was not “withheld” and because it was not 
material. Dennis I, 715 A.2d at 408. Again, these are 
independent reasons why Dennis’s claim failed, and if we 
find that either is a valid basis to reject the claim, Dennis is 
not entitled to relief. We find that the “withheld” issue 
resolves this claim. 
The record is unclear as to whether the prosecution 
received Cason’s public-assistance receipt. Cason’s affidavit 
says that she gave her copy of the receipt to the police (J.A. 
1735), but the police report of their interview with Cason 
makes no mention of this receipt (J.A. 1529). Even the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision is ambiguous. The 
court stated, “During their investigation, however, the police 
                                              
5 As we explained initially, the inadmissibility of the 
Frazier lead documents renders any analysis of the materiality 
prong of Brady unnecessary. Nonetheless, it is worth noting 
that despite the passage of twenty-plus years, no one has ever 
located the subject of Frazier’s lead, the elusive “Tony 
Brown.” 
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came into possession of a [DPW] receipt showing that Cason 
cashed her check at 1:03 p.m.” Dennis I, 715 A.2d at 408. But 
the court then immediately characterized its previous 
statement as “evidence” and ultimately concluded that the 
receipt was not “withheld.” Id. Accordingly, it is unclear 
whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the 
prosecution possessed the receipt, and the record is 
ambiguous as well. Nevertheless, we must give the state 
court’s decision the benefit of the doubt. Cullen v. Pinholster, 
___ U.S. ____, ____, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). 
Accordingly, we ask what arguments could have supported 
the state court’s decision and decide whether those arguments 
are reasonable. Eley, 712 F.3d at 846-47. We find that a valid 
basis exists in the record to conclude that the receipt was not 
suppressed in violation of Brady. 
Brady prohibits the “suppression” of exculpatory, 
material evidence. 373 U.S. at 87. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court and this Court have both interpreted Brady to mean that 
the prosecution does not have to turn over evidence that is 
also available to the defense with reasonable diligence. 
United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“Evidence is not considered to be suppressed if the defendant 
either knew or should have known of the essential facts 
permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory 
evidence.”); Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 305 
(Pa. 2002) (“[N]o Brady violation occurs if the evidence in 
question is available to the defense from non-governmental 
sources or if the defendant knew, or with reasonable diligence 
could have known, of such evidence.” (citations omitted)). 
Recently, we also concluded that it was reasonable for the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court to reject a Brady claim on a 
diligence basis. Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 
2013). In Grant, the prosecution did not disclose that a 
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witness in the defendant’s case had three prior convictions 
and was on parole. Id. at 230. The defendant’s PCRA counsel 
discovered these facts during the post-conviction proceedings. 
Id. at 231. We concluded that the state courts reasonably 
rejected the Brady claim because the fact that the PCRA 
counsel discovered the witness’s criminal history by 
searching public records showed that the trial counsel could 
have discovered the witness’s criminal history with 
reasonable diligence at the time of trial. Id. 
Here, Dennis’s appellate counsel argued that the 
receipt was available with “[a] minimal investigation.” (J.A. 
1800.) Indeed, all indications are that Dennis’s appellate 
counsel, in the process of investigating Cason’s statements for 
purposes of the appeal, went to the DPW and received the 
receipt without any difficulty. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court could reasonably determine that the receipt was 
available with reasonable diligence and, therefore, hold that it 
was not suppressed or withheld in violation of Brady. 
Dennis argues that the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004), rejects a 
reasonable diligence requirement for Brady claims. We 
disagree. In Banks, the prosecution told the defendant that it 
would produce all exculpatory or favorable evidence in its 
possession but failed to disclose that one witness was a police 
informant and that the prosecution had coached another 
witness on what to say at trial. Id. at 675. The prosecution 
later argued that the defendant had procedurally defaulted her 
Brady claim based on the undisclosed evidence by failing to 
present it to the state courts and that her procedural default 
could not be excused because the defendant did not exercise 
due diligence by interviewing the witnesses in question. Id. at 
690-91, 695-98. The Supreme Court—noting that the cause 
and prejudice inquiry to excuse the procedural default merged 
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with the elements of the Brady claim—held that the defendant 
did not need to exercise diligence in the way the state argued 
to preserve her claim. Id. at 698. Accordingly, the defendant 
showed that the prosecution had suppressed the evidence, 
giving cause for the default, and the evidence was material, 
showing prejudice for the default. Id. 
Even assuming that Banks applies—although it was 
issued after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided this 
claim in Dennis I—Banks is distinguishable. In Banks, the 
evidence withheld was something that only existed in the 
possession of the prosecution. The evidence that one witness 
was a police informant and that another witness had been 
coached was only available in the prosecution’s files. But 
here, the evidence that Cason received her public assistance at 
1:03 p.m. was publicly available from the DPW. And as 
Dennis himself argued to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 
even a minimal investigation would have uncovered it. In 
contrast, a minimal investigation in Banks would not have 
uncovered the favorable evidence because the prosecution 
actively misrepresented what evidence it possessed. See id. at 
693. We conclude that Banks does not render a reasonable 
diligence requirement for publicly-available information an 
unreasonable application of clearly-established federal law.  
The Sixth Circuit also rejected a similar argument in 
Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). In that 
case, the prosecution did not disclose publicly-available 
sentencing records that arguably could have demonstrated a 
witness’s bias. Id. at 229-31. The court held that state courts 
could reasonably conclude that the sentencing records were 
not subject to disclosure under Brady because they were 
publicly available and rejected an argument that Banks 
mandated a different result. Id. at 235-36. 
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Dennis also argues that our own precedent does not 
impose a strict reasonable diligence requirement, but our 
precedent instead identifies factors that must be considered. 
Our own precedent cannot constitute clearly-established 
federal law under § 2254. Renico, 559 U.S. at 779. Even if we 
consider our precedent on this issue to reflect clearly-
established Supreme Court precedent, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s adjudication of this claim is still reasonable. 
Generally, we have considered the knowledge of the parties, 
access to the information, and the prosecution’s 
representations in determining whether information was 
available with reasonable diligence to the defendant. See 
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 216 (3d Cir. 2005). 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could reasonably determine 
that those factors suggested that the receipt was available with 
reasonable diligence here: counsel readily secured the receipt 
on appeal and Cason’s importance as a witness to Dennis’s 
alibi was apparent.6 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court could reasonably exclude from the 
prosecution’s Brady obligations evidence that was available 
to Dennis with reasonable diligence. And the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court could also reasonably determine that Cason’s 
public-assistance receipt was publicly available with 
reasonable diligence. Therefore, we find that Dennis is not 
entitled to relief on his Brady claim based on Cason’s public-
assistance receipt. 
                                              
6 In fact, it is worth highlighting that the prosecution 
actually learned of Cason from Dennis. Thus, it was 
reasonable for the prosecution to have believed the defense 
knew of the evidence. 
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Dennis alternatively asks us to adjudicate his 
companion claim: that his trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective in failing to investigate Cason’s story, that counsel 
would have discovered the receipt had he performed the 
investigation, and that the receipt could have affected the 
outcome of the proceedings. The District Court specifically 
reserved judgment on this claim. Dennis V, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 
510 n.27. We decline to address this claim in the first instance 
and will allow the District Court to consider this claim on 
remand. Because we find it unnecessary to address whether 
Cason’s public-assistance receipt was material to Dennis’s 
defense under Brady, and in light of the similarity between 
Brady materiality and Strickland prejudice—see Kyles, 514 
U.S. at 436—we will vacate the District Court’s 
determination that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
unreasonably determined that the receipt was not material 
under Brady. The District Court can and should consider 
Dennis’s ineffective assistance claim based on the receipt 
from a clean slate. 
C. 
Dennis’s final Brady claim concerns a police report of 
an interview with the victim’s aunt, Diane Pugh. The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the report was not 
material because although the report may have been used to 
impeach Zahra Howard’s identification of Dennis as the 
shooter, no reasonable probability of a different result existed 
because Dennis cross-examined Howard about her 
identification of the shooter and two other eyewitnesses 
identified Dennis as the shooter. Dennis IV, 17 A.3d at 463-
64. We find that this conclusion is a reasonable application of 
Supreme Court precedent. 
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It is true that state courts act unreasonably when 
holding that merely because a witness “is impeached in one 
manner, any other impeachment becomes immaterial.” 
Lambert v. Beard, 633 F.3d 126, 134 (3d Cir. 2011), vacated 
on other grounds sub nom. Wetzel v. Lambert, ___ U.S. ____, 
132 S. Ct. 1195 (2012) (per curiam). However, we have 
recognized that “impeachment evidence, if cumulative of 
similar impeachment evidence used at trial . . . is superfluous 
and therefore has little, if any, probative value.” United States 
v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 186 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, using the police report of Pugh’s interview 
arguably would have been cumulative of similar 
impeachment of Howard’s identification of Dennis. On cross-
examination, Howard was asked extensively about her 
identification of Dennis in the photo array and her ability to 
view and remember the shooting. Of principal relevance, 
counsel asked her specifically whether she had ever before 
seen the men who accosted her and Williams. Through it all, 
Howard maintained that Dennis was the shooter. We 
conclude that it was reasonable for the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court to find that attempting to impeach Howard with the 
report—essentially what the police said Pugh said Howard 
said—would have been cumulative of similar impeachment 
that was actually used at trial, namely challenging Howard’s 
identification of Dennis as opposed to someone she already 
knew. 
Lambert v. Beard does not compel a contrary result. In 
Lambert v. Beard, the Commonwealth failed to produce a 
police report in which a key participant-turned-witness 
identified three other participants in the crime instead of the 
two he named at trial. 633 F.3d at 135. The defense had 
argued that other aspects of the witness’s story had changed 
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but had not questioned the witness about the number of 
participants, and the prosecution emphasized that the witness 
consistently identified only two participants in its closing. Id. 
We concluded that it was unreasonable for the state courts to 
reject the defendant’s Brady claim merely because other 
cross-examination on different topics took place. Id. 
This case is unlike Lambert v. Beard. Dennis directly 
asked Howard whether she had ever seen the shooter before, 
and she said no. Her answer to that question, the inherent 
weakness of a multiple-level hearsay document as 
impeachment evidence, and her insistence on naming Dennis 
as the shooter render the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
rationale reasonable. 
We also find the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
second rationale reasonable. The Supreme Court has 
“observed that evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not 
be material if the State’s other evidence is strong enough to 
sustain confidence in the verdict.” Smith v. Cain, ___ U.S. 
____. ____, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012); see also Strickler, 
527 U.S. at 293-94 (observing that “there was considerable 
forensic and other physical evidence linking petitioner to the 
crime” and that “other eyewitnesses” saw the defendant at the 
crime scene and concluding that impeachment evidence for 
one eyewitness was not material). The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court could reasonably conclude that this was the case here: 
two other eyewitnesses testified that Dennis was the shooter, 
decreasing the probability that impeaching Howard’s 
identification would affect the outcome. 
This conclusion is not contrary to or an unreasonable 
application of Kyles. In Kyles, withheld police reports 
suggested that two of four eyewitnesses to the crime had 
changed their story over time. 514 U.S. at 441-45. Kyles is 
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arguably distinguishable in three key ways and, therefore, 
does not render the state court’s decision unreasonable or 
contrary to clearly-established federal law. First, in Kyles, the 
police reports were based on interviews of the eyewitnesses 
themselves. Here, the withheld police report was based on 
what someone else said the eyewitness told her. This distance 
decreases the impeachment value of the report. Second, in 
Kyles, the remaining eyewitnesses “had their best views of 
the gunman only as he fled the scene with his body partly 
concealed in [a] car.” Id. at 445. Here, Bertha, the 
construction worker, stepped toward the shooter after 
Williams was shot, and the shooter raised the gun in Bertha’s 
direction. (J.A. 540-41.) Bertha was “three or four feet” from 
the shooter. (J.A. 541; J.A. 542.) And finally, in Kyles, the 
police reports about the eyewitnesses’ statements were a few 
documents among a wide variety of evidence withheld. The 
Court determined that all of these materials together 
undermined its confidence in the verdict. 514 U.S. at 454. 
Here, this police report of Pugh’s interview is the only 
evidence whose materiality required consideration, given the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s reasonable adjudication of the 
other Brady claims. 7 Accordingly, we conclude that Kyles 
does not make the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision on 
this withheld evidence an unreasonable application of or 
contrary to clearly-established federal law. 
Dennis also argues that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court misstated the facts in its opinion by implying that 
Dennis attended the same high school as Williams and 
                                              
7 In light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
reasonable disposition of the previous two Brady claims, we 
conclude that the court did not need to inquire into the 
cumulative materiality of the three pieces of evidence. 
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Howard and did not consider two of Dennis’s arguments. We 
first find that the court did not get the facts wrong. The court 
noted that the police report suggested Howard recognized the 
shooter from her high school. Dennis IV, 17 A.3d at 306. 
Later, while summarizing the PCRA court’s findings, the 
court stated that Howard denied knowing Dennis or telling 
anyone that she knew Dennis. Id. at 309. At the PCRA 
hearing, Howard testified not only that she did not know 
Dennis but also that she did not know the assailants and never 
told anyone that she did know them. (J.A. 1467.) The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to equate Dennis 
with the shooter, as all proceedings up to that point had 
confirmed, did not mean that the court decided the claim on 
incorrect facts. Moreover, the court’s decision makes clear 
that it understood Dennis was arguing that the shooter was 
someone other than Dennis whom Howard recognized and 
that the court rejected that argument. 
Second, the court did consider all of Dennis’s 
arguments. The court noted that Dennis argued that the report 
“could have led to new investigative avenues” and also 
“could have led counsel to alter his investigative strategy.” 
Dennis IV, 17 A.3d at 307. Thus, the court understood Dennis 
was claiming that the report could impeach the police’s 
investigation of the murder and that the report could have 
assisted counsel’s trial preparation but nonetheless rejected 
the claim. Considering what arguments might have supported 
this rejection, see Eley, 712 F.3d at 846-47, we conclude that 
the rejection was reasonable. That the police heard of this 
alternate identification through a third party and that Howard 
identified Dennis more than once even though she did not 
know him would allow the police to reasonably conclude that 
either Pugh was mistaken in a time of grief or that the officers 
simply transcribed Pugh’s statement incorrectly. And given 
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that counsel already focused on whether Howard was sure 
that Dennis was the shooter at trial, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court could reasonably conclude that the report 
would have minimal impact on Dennis’s trial preparation. 
For these reasons, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
reasonably rejected Dennis’s final Brady claim. 
D. 
Before we conclude, we must address one final matter. 
The Commonwealth has asked us to remand this case to a 
different judge. The Commonwealth complains that the 
District Court made comments about Dennis’s possible 
innocence and about the investigation into Williams’s murder 
that demonstrate the appearance of impropriety. We will deny 
the Commonwealth’s request. 
In our en banc decision in Boyd v. Waymart, 579 F.3d 
330, 333 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc), we remanded a case to a 
different judge to avoid the appearance of impropriety. We 
did so because we remanded an issue that the district court 
had already decided for a new decision, and we wished to 
avoid the appearance of impropriety that might result should 
the district court again reach the same conclusion on the same 
issue. Id. at 339 n.10 (Scirica, C.J., concurring). This is, 
however, “an extraordinary remedy that should seldom be 
employed.” United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 282 (3d 
Cir. 2012). 
Here, we do not believe reassignment is necessary. We 
have finally resolved all of the claims the District Court 
decided, and our remand will not require the District Court to 
decide the same issues or claims it previously decided. 
Rather, it will decide the remaining claims that it has not yet 
considered. We are confident that the District Judge—an 
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experienced, learned, and fair jurist—will be able to apply the 
proper legal standards to the remaining claims. 
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the 
District Court’s order granting Dennis a conditional writ of 
habeas corpus and remand the case for consideration of 
Dennis’s remaining claims in a manner consistent with this 
opinion. 
